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Abstract: The Internet of Thing has profoundly changed the way we imagine information science1
and architectures and Smart Homes are an important part of this domain. Created a decade ago, the2
few existing prototypes use the technologies of the day forcing designers to create centralized and3
costly architectures that raise some issues concerning the reliability, the scalability and ease of access4
which cannot be tolerated in an assistance context. In this paper we briefly introduce a new kind5
of architecture where the focus was placed on the distribution and especially. More specifically,6
we answer the first issue we met by proposing a lightweight and portable messaging protocol.7
After running several tests, we observed a maximized bandwidth, no packets were lost and a good8
encryption was obtained. These results tend to prove that our innovation may be employed in a real9
context of distribution on small entities.10
Keywords: Messaging protocol; IoT; SmartHome; Distributed Computing11
1. Introduction12
The evolution of our society towards the all-digital of the Internet of Things (IoT) profoundly13
remodeled our relationship with the science of information. In this new one, the smart home became14
the subject of numerous researches [1–3] and joins the recent current of thought stemming from the15
Ambient Intelligence (Amb. I). This last one refers to a tendency that wants us to miniaturize a set16
of electronic devices (sensors and effectors) in order to integrate them into any object of everyday life17
(lamp, refrigerator, etc.) in a transparent way for the person. The aim behind this idea is to supply18
punctual assistance to the occupants according to the gathered information and to the history of the19
accumulated data.20
The vast majority of work in the smart home domain focuses on the activity recognition21
problem in order to assist the inhabitant with a potential dementia often caused by an advanced22
age[4–6]. Nevertheless, none of them seems to propose a standard architecture which provides both23
high-reliability and scalability capabilities at a relative low-cost. And still, high-reliability has to be a24
mandatory feature of such architecture since the assistance is vital for the inhabitant with a potential25
dementia. Moreover, as the disease can stay for decades, any work on architecture must take the26
scalability parameter into account since many sensors or improvements can be realized during the27
illness evolution. Finally, the low-cost aspect has to be taken into account as the vast majority of the28
aging population will be located in poor or developing countries by 2050 [7]. As far as we know, this29
paper is the first focusing on those three points in particular.30
Here, we briefly introduce a new kind of smart home architecture providing both reliability and31
scalability based on low-cost smart sensors. To achieve this objective, the first issue we ran into is the32
difference between all the possible entities in the environment. In fact, our solution has to integrate33
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different operating systems (e.g. Linux or FreeRTOS) running on different hardware (e.g. computer or34
microcontroller) and using different communication technologies (e.g. Wi-Fi, ZigBee or 6LowPan). To35
answer these dissimilarities, we have to use a highly portable communication protocol using a broker36
less architecture to provide the highest reliability. This point will be the main concern of this paper.37
Even if many protocols exist like MQTT, RabbitMQ or ZeroMQ [8–10] none of them fully answer our38
requirements since the first two require brokers to work and the last one is based on POSIX sockets39
and cannot be embedded in some light systems. Consequently, the contribution we make in this paper40
is a new way to communicate that can be embedded in every system as soon as they implement an41
IP stack. Our solution provides discovery mechanism, security via AES encryption and two different42
channels in order to address the difference between configuration messages and data messages.43
This paper is divided in four sections. The first one will present a state of the art about existing44
smart homes and their architectures. The second part will cover the technological breakthroughs that45
the embedded computing has experienced since the creation of the first Smart Homes. Then, the46
proposed solution will be explained and some tests on the messaging protocol will be presented in47
the third section. Finally, a conclusion and some future works will end this paper.48
2. Existing architectures49
Many smart habitations have been implemented in laboratories since the creation of the ambient50
intelligence [1,3,11,12]. Each of these projects use the technology of its day to create a testing51
environment in which the data accessibility was the main challenge. Here, we depict three of those52
starting with the LIARA and DOMUS, which share the same architecture [12]. We continue this53
review with the Gator Tech house [3] and CASAS [1]. Finally, we end this part by describing Software54
Defined Smart Home [13,14], a recently released architecture based on software defined networks.55
2.1. LIARA and DOMUS56
LIARA and DOMUS laboratories aim to study how smart homes can assist people with cognitive57
deficiencies. They both created a very similar architecture, represented in Figure 1, to test their58
algorithms and solutions [15]. Inherited from the industry, they use some islands, made of industrial59
grade hardware, to agglomerate transducers. Then, an automate is in charge of getting back, from60
the islands, the values of the sensors or changing the values of the effectors. To end this process,61
the automate will update a relational database hosted on a SQL Server in order to provide a simple62
interface for other systems like, in this case, an artificial intelligence.63
These two smart homes present some interesting features we have to discuss. First, the use of64
industrial grade hardware means that all the components have been tested for a continuous use in65
a far much harder environment than just a house (e.g. production line in a factory). Therefore it66
demonstrates an excellent reliability even if the smart home has to operate at all times. The second67
main advantage of these environments comes from the highly centralized architecture itself. Indeed,68
all the values coming from sensors and all the actuator controls end up in the same database. As a69
result, it facilitates interaction with the home since this kind of storage offers an easy way to retrieve70
sensors values or interact with actuators.71
Nevertheless, industrial material suffers from two main drawbacks. The first one is the72
introduction of black boxes in a research environment. As a matter of fact, the communications73
between all these pieces of hardware often rely on proprietary libraries that can impact future74
evolution. The second main disadvantage is the price of such an architecture. Based on the hardware75
presented by Bouchard et al. and the price of it, we were able to compute the total price of the chain76
Island-Automate-Main Server. With 2000 dollars each island [16], 1500 dollars the automate [16] and77
4000 the server [17], the architecture reaches 13,500 dollars without any transducers or backbone78
structure (e.g. networking, cooling for the server, maintenance). Finally, the highly centralized79
architecture presented here creates many Single Points of Failure (SPoFs) like the automate, the80
Islands and the main server hosting both the AI and the SQL server. So if one of these SPoFs fails,81
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Figure 1. The LIARA and DOMUS architecture.
at least a quarter of the environment and its assistance will fail too. Moreover, these points represent82
some serious bottlenecks in the architecture preventing a real scalability.83
2.2. Gator Tech84
Gator Tech [3] is a project funded in Florida. Its main goal is to prove the feasibility of a low-cost85
smart home where the integration of new transducers will be easy. In order to accomplish that the86
authors present an OSGI [18] based architecture sums up in Figure 2. In this last one, each transducer87
has a simple EEPROM memory containing the driver to communicate with it. Once powered, the88
transducer registers itself by sending its driver to an OSGI service definition. This last one will act89
as an abstraction layer to create basic services that allow the consumption of highly abstracted data90
(e.g. "Sunny" instead of 10 000 lumen for a light sensor) or the combination of basic services to a91
composite service (e.g. create a voice recognition service on all the different microphone services).All92
this architecture allows developers to create applications without any knowledge of the underlying93
communication and with only highly abstracted data which simplify the development.94
This environment has some really good advantages. First of all, the automatic transducer95
registration really helps the scalability of such an environment (e.g. add new sensors or replace96
some of them). Secondly, the high abstraction of the data generates by this system greatly helps97
the application development. For example, it is straightforward to enable the air conditioning when98
the temperature is "Hot.” However, it is more complicated when the decision is only based on the99
microcontroller value since this one depends on the hardware (e.g. the microcontroller itself, the100
temperature sensor or even the analog to digital chips). Finally, the price of such infrastructure is as101
low as possible as every transducer is designed to be the most affordable possible by using Atmega128102
as the main processor unit which is a low-cost platform [19]. Moreover, because every transducer is103
wireless, there is no need of Islands or Automate as in LIARA and Domus homes. Despite all these104
great advantages, the use of OSGI on a unique server create a SPoF which is a big problem in a high105
reliability architecture.106
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Figure 2. The Gator Tech architecture.
2.3. CASAS107
CASAS [1], or the Smart Home in a box, is an infrastructure where the accent was put on the price108
and the ease of installation. Depicted in Figure 3, the architecture is divided in four main elements.109
The first one is the ZigBee mesh which represents all the transducers communicating between them in110
a network where every node relay the information to its neighbors by using the ZigBee protocol. This111
mesh sends events on a Publish/Subscribe (Pub/Sub) messaging service through a ZigBee bridge112
in charge of converting events to higher-level XMPP messages. The messaging service allows other113
applications to easily integrate the infrastructure and use the transducers. By default, there are two114
services which are the Storage and the Intelligence. The first archives all the events occurring in the115
environment by using the Scribe Bridge. As for the intelligence, it is in charge of energy monitoring116
and the discovery and recognition of any activity that can happen in the house.117
CASAS has two main benefits : the price and the ease of installation. For the first, the authors118
present a detailed summary of the cost. They state that their solution cost only 2,765 dollars which119
is really a great achievement. Regarding the ease of installation, they demonstrate it by conducting a120
test on people aged from 21 to 62 and it requires only an hour to set up the whole environment. In121
spit of these qualities, CASAS, as the other architecture, suffer from the existence of many SPoFs like122
the ZigBee bridge or the Application Bridge which can stop the assistance or the Pub/Sub-messaging123
service which is a sensitive component.124
2.4. Software Defined Smart Home125
The works previously described are the old founders of the Smart Home architecture. However,126
some more recent papers exist in this particular domain [13,14]. One of them introduce the idea127
of Software Defined Smart Home or SDSH for short [13]. This concept is a new way to integrate128
heterogeneous smart appliances (e.g. Smart Light, Smart Flowerpot, etc.) in one homogeneous129
platform creating a Smart Home from the chaos of the different hardwares and communication130
protocols implemented by the companies who create these devices. To achieve such a goal, the131
authors propose a three layers architecture derived from software defined networks [20]. First, the132
Smart Devices layer includes all the different kinds of smart hardware in a home (a.k.a. the smart133
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Figure 3. The CASAS architecture.
appliances). Next, the controller layer is a centralized management service locally implemented or134
deployed in the cloud. Its main goal is to hide the implementation details of the hardware layer,135
retrieve and analyze the user demands and manage the whole smart home. Moreover, it is in charge136
of encapsulates information extracted from the smart home and provide them to the last layer : the137
external service layer. This last one uses the smart home resources to provide some smart services138
like home security or medical attention.139
SDSH offers some great features. First of all, as Gator Tech, this architecture offers a strong140
separation between raw sensors and final services via its controller layer. Next, it uses OpenFlow141
[21] as its main protocol which is a well-known protocol widely implemented in software defined142
network. Finally, it uses smart appliances already in the market and standardize the access to their143
data. Unfortunately, the centralized controller depicted as one of the main advantages of this work144
is also a great default because, if it allows to configure the whole Smart Home at the same place,145
it represents a severe single point of failure. To answer this problematic, the authors introduced146
visualization techniques but these one require either an Internet cloud connection (which cannot be147
tolerated in some applications) or a server strong enough to deal with many systems started on the148
same hardware which can be very expensive for a single house.149
2.5. Conclusion on existing architectures150
All these existing architectures have some common points. First the majority of their components151
are transducers. Moreover, according to the Gator Tech and CASAS cases, it seems that embed152
some intelligence and communication abilities in them helps to reduce costs and ease installation153
and scalability. Finally, we have to point out the common problem in all these architectures: the154
centralization. This weakness creates single points of failure which can lead to a complete stop of the155
assistance. In corporate computing and Web domains, this particular issue has been solved ten years156
ago by using redundancy, clusters and distributed computing [22–25].157
The ideal architecture appears to be composed of many smart transducers easing the scalability158
of such architecture. This specific attribute bring our environment closer to another computer science159
domain which is the Internet of Things (IoT). In this last one, already used in the Smart Home [26,27],160
a multitude of smart objects communicate in a uniform manner and generates a huge amount of data161
often associate to "Big Data" [28]. In this last case, it is not conceivable to handle the information in a162
centralized way any more, even if we use server clusters. It is more appropriate to use decentralized163
Version November 7, 2017 submitted to Sensors 6 of 19
methods relocating the intelligence as close as possible to the units composing this huge data pool164
[28,29].165
3. Technological breakthroughs166
The transducers (i.e. sensors and actuators) are the essential basis of every Smart Home167
architecture. CASAS and Gator Tech case studies proved that embed intelligence and communication168
in these entities allow to reduce costs while improving the ease of implementation and the scalability.169
In this part, we are going to study the concept of a smart transducer such as designed by the170
standards. Then, we will review some hardware evolution realized since the creation of the first171
Smart Homes.172
A smart transducer is clearly defined in the IEEE 1451.2 standard [30]. To sum up, it is an entity173
providing more features than the one’s mandatory to generate a good representation of the controlled174
quantity. Some of these attributes can be sensor identification, a process to simplify the installation or175
the maintenance, network interfaces or the coordination and synchronization with other entities [31].176
In order to guide the community, Lewis [31] proposed three objectives for these transducers. The first177
one is to move the intelligence closest to the sensing point. The second one is to make the installation178
easier, and the maintenance of massive distributed sensor networks less expensive. The last one is to179
facilitate the interfacing of many different sensors. Now that the concept of a smart transducer is well180
defined, we can work at the different technological breakthroughs that occur during the last ten years181
and allow us to finally design and build inexpensive smart sensors for the smart environments.182
Many prototypes of smart environment have emerged during the last decade (e.g. Gator Tech in183
2005 or LIARA/DOMUS in 2009 [3,12]. They have been built on top of existing technologies, which184
for the most part are anterior to great innovations made recently. One of these is the apparition and185
especially the democratization of System on Chip (SoC) which are full systems integrated on a single186
substrate providing all the elements to run an application (e.g. processor, memory, radio). The SoCs187
are the cutting edge of the modern electronic and can be found everywhere from smart sensors to188
nano-computers and drive the price and power consumption reduction in all the modern devices189
[32].190
To illustrate the growth in power and integration, we propose to make a quick comparison191
between two microcontrollers platforms and some nano computers. The first two are the Arduino192
USB, easily accessible at the time of the creation of the first smart homes, and the latest released193
ESP 32 from the Espressif company. Concerning the nano computers, we chose the evolution of194
the Raspberry Pi since its creation. The attributes we compare are the released year, the processor195
frequency, the memory available, the connectivity, the relative size and the price. Tables 1 and 2196
both represents the different values for the attributes retain respectively for the micro controllers and197
the Raspberry Pi. The first thing that jump out from these tables is the increase in both processor198
frequency and memory with 16 MHz and 1 kB of RAM for the Arduino USB to a dual core 240 MHz199
with 512 kB of RAM for the ESP 32. And the phenomenon is the same for the different Raspberry Pi200
with 700 MHz and 512 MB of RAM for the Pi1 to 1 GHz and the same amount of memory but with201
half the size of the Pi Zero W and four cores at 1.2GHz with 1 GB of RAM for the Pi3 but with the202
same form factor. Moreover, it is pretty obvious that the embedded connectivity became a must in203
this period with the integration of Wi-Fi and both Bluetooth and BLE on the ESP 32 and Wi-Fi/BLE204
for the Pi Zero W and Pi3. Finally, it must be noted that the price of these platform stay the same of205
decrease drastically even if the platforms increase in power and connectivity.206
Technological evolution since the beginning of the 2000s was impressive. The democratization207
of the SoC permits an increase of power for such piece of hardware while reducing costs and power208
consumption. In parallel, SoC integrate much more advanced features like Wi-Fi and Bluetooth209
communication. Subsequently, it seems now possible to create powerful applications on embedded210
hardware and one of these applications is the creation of more intelligent transducers as depicted in211
the IEEE 1451 standard.212
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Table 1. Arduino USB and ESP 32 comparison
Arduino USB ESP32 Thing
Released Year 2005 2016
Processor Frequency 16 MHz 2 x 240 Mhz
Memory 1 kB 512 kB
Connectivity None Bluetooth + BLE and WiFi
Relative size 1 0.5
Price (USD) 35 7
Table 2. Raspberry Pi platform over time
Pi 1 Pi Zero W Pi 3
Released Year 2012 2017 2016
Processor Frequency 700MHz 1 GHz 4 x 1.2GHz
Memory 512 MB 512 MB 1 GB
Connectivity None BLE/WiFi BLE/WiFi
Relative size 1 0.5 1
Price (USD) 35 9 35
4. Proposed solution213
We saw that existing smart homes had some weaknesses in both reliability and scalability. Yet214
these kinds of weak points are not bearable in the assistance domain. Here, we propose a new kind215
of architecture using the latest technological advances to provide a reliable and scalable distributed216
environment to safely run the assistance.217
The main concept behind our solution is that the only non-removable elements of a smart218
environment are the transducers themselves. And if we think about it, they represent a vast number219
of distributed entities. With the latest hardware innovations it is feasible to equip each of them with220
an intelligent entity with both communication and processing capabilities creating a huge network221
with highly distributed computation potential and no single point of failure. In this vision, the222
generic smart entities have to answer the three main objectives firstly formulated by Lewis [31]. It223
means that they must allow to move the artificial intelligence to the closest sensing point, provide224
methods to easily install, configure and maintain this smart network and finally ease the interfacing225
between many different sensors. The first issue that such an architecture has to deal with is the226
difference between all the intelligent entities we can use. Indeed, if we want our solution to be227
the most generic possible we have to cope with the most different hardware and operating systems.228
Thus, we want to make feasible the integration of sensors based on different operating systems (e.g.229
Linux or FreeRTOS) implemented on different hardware but also to be able to interface different230
communication protocols (e.g. ZigBee, Wi-Fi or BLE). In order to answer this problem, we had to231
think of a new way to communicate between all these entities.232
4.1. Communication protocol233
There are many ways to communicate by using messages in the literature or industry. As far234
as we know the most popular ones are MQTT, RabbitMQ and ZeroMQ [8,9,33]. The first of them is235
mainly used in the Internet of Thing application by its high portability and its reduce footprint in236
terms of memory and power. It’s a publish/subscribe protocol where clients connect to a centralized237
instance named broker. It supports different type of quality of service which affects the reliability238
of communication (message is delivered at most once, at least once or exactly once). Finally, it can239
support a “Last will and testament” (LWT) which allows to send a specific message on a specific240
subject when the entity disconnect in an abnormal way from the network. RabbitMQ, on the other241
hand, is a leading messaging protocol mainly use in distributed architectures. It implements the242
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Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP) and consequently has a broker architecture which243
provides ease of development in favor of scalability and speed since the broker adds latency and244
treatment and the message exchanged are pretty big. Finally, ZeroMQ is a messaging system which245
allows developers to create themselves the architecture including brokerless ones. The main problem246
with this approach is the portability since ZeroMQ relies on POSIX sockets which are only supported247
in Unix and Windows operating systems. To conclude, none of the leading messaging protocol fit in248
our application since we want one without a centralized unit like a broker and heavily portable in249
order to deal with the most part of the possible entities in a Smart Home which can be composed of250
embedded systems running on top of different Real Time Operating Systems (RTOS) like FreeRTOS251
or RiotOS.252
The contribution we make in this paper is a new communication protocol with two main253
characteristics. First, it can be embedded on any device from computers to microcontrollers as long254
as they implement an IP stack (over Wi-Fi, 6LowPan or ZigBee IP). Second, our protocol does not255
have the need for any main server also known as a broker. This last point was an issue in the most256
popular solutions (e.g. MQTT, NATS, etc.). To build our solution, we made two basic assumptions.257
The first one is that all our messages will stay in the smart home network. The second is that UDP is258
the minimum requirement for any device that wants to communicate over a network as it is the base259
of many network configuration protocols (e.g. DHCP or DNS).260
One of the first issues we ran into is the fundamental difference between configuration and261
data streams. The first one has to be based on a reliable delivery system allowing point to point262
communication without the urge of the highest data speed. The second one, have to be able to stream263
a huge quantity of information in a minimum of time without the highest reliability to many different264
listeners. In order to answer this problematic, we propose to use two different channels like the FTP265
protocol [34]. We will now explain how these two channels work in order to offer all the features we266
want.267
4.1.1. Configuration channel268
269
As said sooner, the configuration of a smart entity has to be distributed over a reliable270
communication. In order to achieve this objective, we propose to use CoAP, a well-known IoT271
protocol, already implemented in many platforms [35]. It allows us to use HTTP-like request to get272
or change values represented by URI in a fail-safe manner based on an acknowledgment system for273
important messages (i.e. messages with high reliability). We propose to use this URI representation274
for the entity configuration. In order to facilitate the understanding of such a concept, we present a275
simple example in Table 3. In this table, each line represents a possible configuration variable with276
its CoAP URI, the methods allowed in order to get or set the information and the type of data that277
is asked by the entity. The first one is pretty obvious and represents the update frequency used by278
a potential sensor. It is a simple integer, represents by the URI /rate and that can be obtained or279
modified by using respectively GET or POST request. The usage of a HTTP-like protocol allows us280
to define read-only values like the version which is a string that is only reachable via a GET request281
on the /version URI. Moreover, we can exchange much more complex data types like JSON to clearly282
define hardware configurations and interaction. Another interesting feature of CoAP that we use283
in our configuration sample is the block-wise extension of the protocol that permit the transfer of284
large binary file like updates for the embedded software. Finally, the last feature of CoAP we use285
in this configuration channel is the ability to encrypt the communication by the usage of DTLS. To286
demonstrate the utility of such a feature we propose to change symmetric encryption keys on the287
device. This kind of operation is critical since it has to be highly secured in order to guarantee the fact288
that nobody can intercept these keys to listen and speak over a secure network. With our method, we289
simply exchange keys by using CoAP protected by SSL which guarantees both confidentiality and290
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Table 3. A configuration example based on CoAP
URI Methods allowed Data type
Update rate /rate GET/POST Integer
Version /version GET String
Hardware /hardware GET/POST JSON
Update /update POST Binary
Encryption key /keys POST Binary
authentication. Now that the configuration channel operation is explained, we can think about how291
to exchange information through the data channel.292
4.1.2. Data channel293
294
In addition to a reliable communication channel to ensure the good configuration of any295
device, we have to provide a method to exchange data messages between the smart entities in our296
architecture. We want to be able to transfer huge data in a minimal amount of time, to discover smart297
sensors connected to the network and to give the ability to encrypt sensitive information. To attain298
these aims, we propose a simple publish/subscribe messaging protocol based on UDP multicast299
chosen for its ability to transfer to one or many listeners at once in addition to its low-latency. To300
sum up the protocol work-flow, users join the multicast group, they register to any topic, represented301
by a simple character string, and will receive any messages labeled by this topic. They may also ask302
for any sensors connected to the network group by sending a discovery packet with a request in it303
(e.g. sensors with service "temperature") and those sensors will answer with their IP address and the304
different topics they expose. We are now going to explain the three different modes of our messaging305
protocol which are data, discovery and encrypted data.306
4.1.3. Data message307
308
Figure 4a represents a single and unencrypted data message in our solution. Every packet begins309
with an options byte, divided in two parts. The first three most significant bits (MSB) compose the310
version number of this packet and is all set to 0 for the version we present here. The other bits311
are reserved and unused except for the two least significant bits (LSB) who represent flags used in312
discovery and encrypted mode and have to be set to 0. These options are followed by the topic length313
which can go from 1 to 255 characters encoded on a single byte. Any message without topic has to314
be considered as an error and forget. Next come the topic with a variable length defined previously315
followed by the data length encoded on two bytes (the protocol tolerate empty data packages) and316
the data associated. Finally, a checksum is computed with the whole packet by using the CRC-32317
algorithm already used in the Ethernet frame which is a fast and lightweight hash algorithm. It has318
to be noted that the maximum size of one packet is limited by the theoretical limit of UDP which is319
65,535 bytes. When a client receives a packet, the first operation he has to do with it is the checksum320
validation. If this fails, the packet has to be dropped as the protocol does not have any mechanisms321
to send the packet again. Otherwise, the packet can be split by using the different sizes and the data322
and topic can be easily read.323
4.1.4. Discovery message324
325
A really interesting feature we have to provide is a mechanism to discover entities in the network.326
To achieve this, each of them can register custom key-value pairs in addition to any readable (i.e.327
allowing GET method) configuration values that will be exposed to any discovery request. Figure 4b328
Version November 7, 2017 submitted to Sensors 10 of 19
Figure 4. Representation of the three packets present in our protocol.
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Table 4. An example of the discovery decision process
Key Requested Exposed Conclusion
version "1.0.1" "1.0.1" OK
name "temp2" "temp32" NOK
units "C" ["C", "F"] OK
units "K" ["C", "F"] NOK
units ["C", "F"] "C" OK
units ["C", "F"] "K" NOK
units ["C", "F"] ["C", "K"] OK
units ["C", "F"] ["K", "R"] NOK
represents a single discovery packet. As the data packet, the options come first. The only difference is329
the LSB of this particular byte which is set to 1 representing a discovery packet. Next come the length330
of the data containing the request, a simple key-value data structure represented in JSON format.331
For security reasons, data has to be set in order to limit the number of answers. Consequently, any332
discovery packets with a zero-length data have to be ignored and consider as an error. When the333
frame is received, receivers will have to decide if they have to answer or not. To achieve this, they334
check every key in the request if they do not have one of them they can drop the packet they must335
not answer. Regarding the associated values, two cases are possible : either the key contains a single336
value or an array of values. Consequently, four situations can occur depending on the combination of337
two different data type on the receiver and the sender. Examples of each case are presented in Table338
4. The first case shown here is when both requested and exposed are single value. In this case, the339
two values have to be exactly the same as presented in the first two lines of the table. Next, come the340
case where one has an array and the other a single value here, the single value has to be in the array341
like in the lines 3 to 6 in the Table 4. Finally, when both have arrays as values, at least one value in the342
requested array has to be present in the exposed one.343
4.1.5. Encrypted data message344
345
As we deal with sensitive information inside a smart environment, our protocol has to provide346
an easy way to secure the communications. We adapt a well-known secure chat found in the Telegram347
[36] application to achieve this goal.348
The encryption process starts by adding random padding to the message. Indeed, Advanced349
Encryption Standard (AES), the encryption algorithm we use, is a block cipher so our data have to350
be a multiple of the block size Bs. The number of random bytes Ps we have to add is defined by351
the formula 1. We always add Bs bytes in order to always put some randomness in the original352
message then, we add enough bytes to be a multiple of Bs (16 in the case of AES). In formula 1 we353
use DataLength + 2 because the last step in the packet preparation is the prepending of the data size354
a two-byte long number.355
Ps = Bs + (Bs − (DataLength + 2)%Bs) (1)
When the packet is ready to be encrypted, we create the message key used to generate the AES356
key and IV by computing the SHA1 of the packet to encrypt. This hash is given to a Key Derivation357
Function (KDF) with the Secret Key preconfigured by using the configuration channel. The KDF358
presented in algorithm 1 is a sequence of different SHA1 hash and will result in two values, the359
128-bit AES Key and AES IV used to encrypt the packet with AES. Next, in order to identify the secret360
key used to encrypt, we compute a unique fingerprint of it by using the Base64 representation of the361
key SHA256. Finally, the hash message authentication code (HMAC) is computed by using the secret362
key with the SHA1 hashing algorithm.363
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Figure 5. The encryption process.
Data: secret_key[16], msg_key[20]
Result: aes_key[16], aes_iv[16]
sha1_a = sha1(msg_key + secret_key[0...3]);
sha1_b = sha1(secret_key[4...5] + msg_key + secret_key[6...7]);
sha1_c = sha1(secret_key[8...11] + msg_key);
sha1_d = sha1(msg_key + secret_key[12...15]);
aes_key = sha1_a[0...3] + sha1_b[0...7] + sha1_c[4...7];
aes_iv = sha1_a[12...15] + sha1_b[12...19] + sha1_d[0...3];
Algorithm 1: The Key Derivation Function
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Figure 6. The decryption process.
In order to decrypt an encrypted packet (identified by a 1 at position 1 in the option byte of the364
header) the receiver has to do some operations sum up in Figure 6. The first task to accomplish is to365
verify the HMAC to ensure the authentication and the integrity of the packet. To accomplish this, we366
first have to retrieve the preconfigured secret key used to encrypt identified by its fingerprint. Next,367
we can compute the HMAC of the packet (without the sender HMAC) and check for equality. If368
the two hash message authentication codes are different, the packet must be dropped otherwise, the369
decryption process can begin. First, we have to reconstruct the AES key and IV used to encrypt the370
message by passing the preconfigured secret key and the message key received in the KDF algorithm371
presented earlier. Next, we can use AES 128 algorithm in decrypt mode with the generated key and372
IV to finally decrypt the whole message. The final step is to remove the padding bytes which can be373
easily done with the message size store in the first two bytes.374
4.2. Tests and discussion375
In order to validate the proposed protocol, we have made three tests on it. The first one is about376
bandwidth and try to maximize the number of messages per second exchanged to demonstrate the377
speed of our protocol. The second one answers a question about the UDP protocol. Indeed, UDP does378
not provide safety mechanisms about lost, corrupted or disordered network packet. Consequently we379
decide to show the number of packets we did not receive because of this lack. Finally, we want to380
demonstrate the fact that even with the same message and secret key, our encrypted packet is always381
totally different in order to prevent semantic attack since our Initialization Vector is not randomly382
generated. To accomplish that, we will compute a similarity measure between encrypted packets383
containing the same message with the same encryption key. The hardware used in our tests was a384
laptop (MSI GT62VR), a Raspberry Pi 3 and a Raspberry Pi Zero W. The first one was connected to a385
Gigabit wireless router (LinkSys WRT1900AC) through its Gigabit wired and wireless (AC Wi-Fi) card386
and the other ones over a simple Wi-Fi connection. Concerning the implementation of our solution,387
we used C++ with the libraries Boost ASIO (for the network) and Crypto++ (for the encryption388
algorithms).389
In order to test the bandwidth capabilities of our protocol, we first generate 9 random messages390
with different sizes from 16 bytes to 60 kibibytes (kiB). Then, we bound a listening process on the391
wired network card on the laptop in order to monitor the packets transiting through the network392
while we use wireless connections to send 20 000 packets for each different sizes with 10 000 encrypted393
and another 10 000 not. Results from this test are summed up in Figures 7 to 9 where the upper plot394
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represents the messages per second (Msg/s) and the lower one the data rate in mebibytes per second395
(MiB/s) transmitted by our protocol both depending on the message size. Figure 7, 8, 9 respectively396
show the laptop, Raspberry Pi 3 and Raspberry Pi Zero W results. The first thing we can note is the397
important drop in both data rates and message per second occurring for packet larger than 2kiB on398
every platform and for both encrypted and non-encrypted messages. With respectively 10.9, 13.1, 3.8,399
4.6, 2.2 and 2.78 times fewer messages sent depending on the platform and encryption, our solution400
seems to present a limit concerning high-frequency large messages (greater than 1000 per second). We401
investigate the reason for such a decreasing in performances and it seems to be fragmented Ethernet402
packets that appear when the length of the transported data is greater than the maximum data size403
of an Ethernet packet which is 1522 bytes. The second observation is pretty obvious and is the fact404
that message rate and data rate decreased when using encryption. This is due to the computation405
of different cryptographic algorithms like AES or SHA but we can say that for a packet under the406
2kiB limit the encryption process does not impact too much our protocol. Finally, we can say that our407
protocol does not overload the Raspberry Pi Zero W, the smallest platform, since both encrypted and408
clear tests give nearly the same results in terms of data rates which can be explained by a fully used409
network adapter.410
Figure 7. Bandwidth results in terms of Msg/s and MiB/s for 10,000 send on the laptop of an
increasing message size in both encrypted and clear mode
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Figure 8. Bandwidth results in terms of Msg/s and MiB/s for 10,000 send on the Raspberry Pi 3 of an
increasing message size in both encrypted and clear mode
Figure 9. Bandwidth results in terms of Msg/s and MiB/s for 10,000 send on the Raspberry Pi Zero
W of an increasing message size in both encrypted and clear mode
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UDP is a protocol without any reliability mechanisms. It means that packets can be lost or411
corrupt and the protocol does not support any means to retrieve this packet unlike TCP. As our work412
is based on UDP and does not provide such mechanisms either, we wanted to show and quantify413
the risk of data loss. To do so, we create 10 000 messages of 1kiB composed by a two-bytes long414
sequence number and some random padding. While the wired interface on the laptop monitor the415
packet arrival (order, corruption using the embedded checksum or loss) the wireless connections416
send 10 000 packets in order. The results of this test are summed up in Table 5 where each line417
represents a different platform (laptop, raspberry Pi 3 and raspberry Pi zero W) and the three columns418
are respectively the number of lost packet, corrupted ones and finally the number of sequencing419
problems. As we can see, on the same network, we did not lose or receive corrupted packets but we420
had some problem in the sequence (2 for the laptop and Raspberry Pi 3 and 3 for the Raspberry Pi421
Zero W). That means that over 10 000 messages only 2 or 3 arrive before the previous one a result that422
tends to prove the relative reliability of our protocol even if we use UDP as our transport protocol.423
Table 5. Number of lost, corrupted or misplaced packets over 10,000 send of a 1kiB message
Sender Packets lost Packets corrupted Sequence problem
Laptop 0 0 2
Pi 3 0 0 2
Pi Zero W 0 0 3
The last test we did is a similarity test. Indeed, while we ensure the confidentiality of the data in424
encrypted mode, we did not randomly generated our Initialization Vector (IV) for the AES encryption.425
Instead, we use an algorithm (KDF described in algorithm 1) to be able to compute the IV based on426
information found in the encrypted packet and the secret key. And yet, the randomization of this IV427
guarantees the semantic security of AES. Consequently we wanted to know if our algorithm using428
random padding bytes is random enough to ensure a non-similarity between encrypted packets with429
the same secret key and containing the same data. To validate this point, we compute the Euclidian430
distance between 1000 secured packets containing the same 1kiB message of random data. The results431
of this test are summed up in table 6. In this last one, the first line represents the maximum distance432
we can obtain by having one packet with all bytes set to 0 and the other 255 this maximum distance433
will be used as a reference to compute the percentage of difference between packets. Next comes the434
mean distance computed on all the packets, with a value of 3458.79, together with a maximum of435
3775.54 and a minimum of 3175.23, we can say that our algorithm guarantee a relative non-similarity436
between those packets. Finally, we report the mean difference percentage of 42.39% in the last line437
of the results table. This means that for the exact same packet encrypted with our algorithm we438
generate encrypted packets that are on average 42.39% different. Consequently, we can say that our439
encryption process, even if it does not use a full random one, compute sufficiently different IV for the440
same packet in order to protect it from semantic and similarity attacks.441
Table 6. Distance between 1000 packets containing the same message of 1kiB on the same topic and
encrypted with the same encryption key
Variable Value
Maximum theoretical distance 8160
Mean distance 3458.79
Maximum distance 3775.54
Minimum distance 3175.23
Mean difference percentage 42.39%
In conclusion, we can say that our tests were divided in three. The first one was to compute the442
speed capabilities of our protocol. In this case the results demonstrate that for data under 2kiB we443
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assure a very high speed with nearly a thousand messages per second on the lightest platform we444
executed the test on. Another conclusion that we made thanks to this test is the relative low-impact445
of the encryption even on light platform. The second test was realized to ensure the reliability of446
UDP multicast on a single network. Indeed, this communication protocol does not provide reliability447
insurance mechanisms and we wanted to put a number on the risks inherent in its usage. With 0448
packet lost or corrupted and a maximum of 3 order problems over 10 000 messages sent we can safely449
say that even if we use UDP as our base communication protocol, our method seems to be reliable450
enough for data streaming inside a Smart Home. Finally, the last test we executed was to compute451
the similarity between secured packets containing the same message and encrypted with the exact452
same secret key. Indeed as our Initialization Vector is computed instead of randomly generated we453
had to prove that the semantic security of AES is guaranteed. Our results show that our algorithm to454
derive the AES key and IV from the message itself and the secret pre-shard key is random enough to455
an average of 42.39% difference between 1000 encrypted packets containing the same data.456
5. Conclusions and future works457
In this paper, we introduced a new distributed way to communicate between smart entities458
distributed in an environment. Unlike MQTT or RabitMQ, well-known protocols, we don’t need459
to have a centralized broker instance and unlike ZMQ, a well-known framework to implement460
messaging protocols, we don’t rely on POSIX sockets which are hard to embed on tiny devices461
without a Linux or Windows operating system. Our protocol, like FTP, relies on two channels. The462
first one is for the configuration of every entity in the network and is based on COAP, a well-known463
protocol in the field of the Internet of Thing, for its reliability. The other one is a data channel, based464
on multicast messages with a protocol entirely define in this paper. This last one permits to send465
discovery requests to the network as well as messages encrypted or not. For the encrypted way, we466
adapt the Telegram protocol a well-known secure instant messaging protocol in order to work on tiny467
devices and provide an easy authentication with a HMAC.468
In this paper, we realized three different tests to ensure our capabilities in terms of speed,469
reliability and security. In the light of the results, we can say that for data under 2kiB we ensure470
a very high speed with nearly a thousand messages per second on the lightest platform we executed471
the test on. Moreover, with no packet lost or corrupted and a maximum of 3 order problems over472
10 000 messages sent we can safely say that our method seems reliable enough for data streaming.473
Finally, our results show that our algorithm to derive the AES key and IV from the message itself and474
the secret pre-shard key is random enough to generate an average of 42.39% difference between 1000475
encrypted packets containing the same data ensuring the security against semantic attacks.476
Ultimately, we can say that our protocol with its two channels allows to make a difference477
between configuration values which need a high reliability but won’t be changing every millisecond478
and data values or streaming which need higher data rates but less reliability. Moreover, our protocol479
support a native encryption mode which provides security for sensitive information we can easily480
find in a Smart Home. In addition, we designed our innovation to be both brokerless, which is481
the main difference between many existing messaging protocol, and easily portable as it only relies482
on UDP, a communication protocol found in every network applications. Lastly, as a future work,483
we want to realize more tests including tests on embedded environment, like a Real Time OS on a484
microcontroller and tests with a lot more entities in the network.485
Abbreviations486
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:487
AES: Advanced Encryption Standard488
AI : Artificial Intelligence489
Amb. I: Ambiant Intelligence490
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AMQP: Advanced Message Queuing Protocol491
BLE: Bluetooth Low-Energy492
CoAP : Constrained Application Protocol493
CRC: Cyclic Redundancy Check494
EEPROM : Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory495
GHz: gigahertz496
HMAC : keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code497
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol498
IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers499
IoT: Internet of Things500
IV: Initialization Vector501
KDF : Key Derivation Function502
LNCF: Lght Node Communication Framework503
LIARA: Laboratoire d’Intelligence Ambiante pour la Reconnaissance d’Activités504
LSB : Least Significant Bit505
LWT: Last Will Testament506
kB: kilobyte507
kiB: kibibyte508
kiB/s: kibibyte/second509
MHz: megahertz510
MiB: mebibyte511
MiB/s: mebibyte/second512
MSB : Most Significant Bit513
Msg/s: messages/seconds514
OSGI: Open Service Gateway Initiative515
RAM: Random Access Memory516
RTOS : Real Time Operating System517
SDSH: Software Defined Smart Home518
SHA: Secure Hash Algorithms519
SoC: System on Chip520
SPoF: Single Point of Failure521
UDP: User Datagram Protocol522
XMPP : eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol523
ZMQ : ZeroMQ524
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